Constitutionalism is preventing the government from taking action. This is constitutionalism in it's purest form. They have studied the document and determined when impeachment says remove from office, it cannot possibly be applied to someone who is not in office. People arguing this point in the Trump case are arguing to restrain government power. "That’s who you’re twisting the Constitution for, Sen. Lee???" Um, he retraining his own power in favor of the constitution. That is constitutionalist.
Trump did not resign, he was not re-elected. The people have spoken As the font of all power in our government, their word should take precedent over all other matters. Trump could run for office again In which case the people (not congress) have the ability to deny him future office. Your examples confuse people who resign, or who were appointed, with elected officials. There is an enormous difference there. I'll say it one more time - it is not congress' job to prevent Trump from seeking future office, it is the PEOPLE's JOB. And if Trump actually broke the law, there are other avenues to trial and conviction.
"would allow any impeached official to dodge trial and disqualification by resigning even a minute before trial, especially once they had a sense the vote was headed to conviction.”
So? This is not a criminal trial, this is a trial to remove the individual from office, basically firing them from their job. If the person leaves office (quits), it can be likened to pleading guilty - it's over. As to disqualification - the people and the government retain the power to prevent such individuals from re-seeking office. That option is up to us, not the disgraced office holder. I very much doubt any person in such a situation would ever successfully seek office again.
Anyway, you are basically making an elitist case that the people are morons who might re-elect Trump, and you can't have that. But in a democracy you must occasionally take such risks to preserve freedom. Otherwise we devolve into oligarchy, a tyranny of the anointed who decide who is worthy to rule. That is not especially constitutionalist.
And seriously, cleanup your arguments. Many are just beneath you.
Prof. Shugerman echoed the argument I mentioned a few moments ago: that a rule against impeachment of former officeholders “would allow any impeached official to dodge trial and disqualification by resigning even a minute before trial, especially once they had a sense the vote was headed to conviction.” As Shugerman and Brian Kalt have argued: “this rule would have a perverse effect that the most guilty officials would be most likely to avoid disqualification, and it would be odd to put a process so entirely in the hands of a defendant.”
That's an interesting prosecutorial take on a political trial. In my opinion - they are not the same. Politicians should not be disbarred from future offices without a trial of facts which looking at the past Presidential impeachments, they were not.
Supporting my argument and in a major factor in forming my opinion is this:
"We also think that our position is the one that is normatively sound. The impeachment process is a political process that allows Congress to cleanse the government between elections: when there is no time to wait for an appeal to the people. But the impeachment process is a political process. The people doing the impeaching may not only be wrong, but they also might be the wrongdoers. Our position in regard to the scope of disqualification allows the voters, not Congress, to have the last word. If the voters return a disqualified defendant to elective office it is because where in doubt, it is the voters, not their agents in Congress, who should have the last word."
Josh Blackman continues with the first and freshest impeachment case after the adaption of the constitution, an impeachment against a US Senator from PA:
"1799 Senate impeachment trial proceedings of Senator William Blount. He was the first officeholder impeached under the Constitution. During the Senate trial, both Blount's counsel and a House Manager articulated their views about the scope of the Impeachment Disqualification Clause. The views they articulated are consistent with the view we have advanced.
Blount was represented by Alexander J. Dallas. Dallas is well known in today's legal community for serving as the first Reporter of Decisions of the United States Supreme Court. He also held cabinet positions and high state office in Pennsylvania. Dallas explained that the Impeachment Disqualification Clause serves as "in effect, [as] a check or limitation to the general power of the Executive." How? The Senate, by voting to disqualify an officeholder, "declar[es] that the delinquent officer, shall be removed, and that he shall never be re-appointed." Dallas's understanding of the Impeachment Disqualification Clause's design was limited: the Senate had the power to restrict the "attributes and exercises of Executive Authority" that includes the power "to appoint, to re-appoint, or to abstain from re-appointing."
Later in the trial, Dallas reaffirmed his position. He said, "it is manifest, that by the power of [i]mpeachment, the people did not mean to guard against themselves, but against their agents; they did not mean to exclude themselves from the right of re-appointing, or pardoning; but to restrain the Executive Magistrate from doing either, with respect to officers, whose offices were held independent of popular choice." Here too, Dallas's position directly supports the view we have advanced. The Impeachment Disqualification Clause was not designed to serve as a "guard against" the People who use "popular choice" to elect federal officials. Rather, this provision would serve to "guard against" the President's undermining a House impeachment and Senate removal. Consider a situation where a defendant is impeached, tried, convicted, removed, and disqualified. Then, the President re-appoints that person to another appointed position, or even to the same position he previously held. This reappointment would undermine the House's and Senate's power in the impeachment context. In other words, the Impeachment Disqualification Clause prevents the President from re-appointing the disqualified defendant to an office "held independent of popular choice."
The last paragraph of Federalist 77 explains the intent and the plain constitutionalism. There are many other notable and reasonable pled arguments supporting the GOP position as there are many well reasoned arguments from those in opposition.
Excellent post and I think your analysis is exactly right. It's not a Grand Old Party anymore.
Patterico seems unaware that Art. 1 Section 3 is limited to Impeachment of a president.Trump is not president. Game ,set and match.
Constitutionalism is preventing the government from taking action. This is constitutionalism in it's purest form. They have studied the document and determined when impeachment says remove from office, it cannot possibly be applied to someone who is not in office. People arguing this point in the Trump case are arguing to restrain government power. "That’s who you’re twisting the Constitution for, Sen. Lee???" Um, he retraining his own power in favor of the constitution. That is constitutionalist.
Trump did not resign, he was not re-elected. The people have spoken As the font of all power in our government, their word should take precedent over all other matters. Trump could run for office again In which case the people (not congress) have the ability to deny him future office. Your examples confuse people who resign, or who were appointed, with elected officials. There is an enormous difference there. I'll say it one more time - it is not congress' job to prevent Trump from seeking future office, it is the PEOPLE's JOB. And if Trump actually broke the law, there are other avenues to trial and conviction.
"would allow any impeached official to dodge trial and disqualification by resigning even a minute before trial, especially once they had a sense the vote was headed to conviction.”
So? This is not a criminal trial, this is a trial to remove the individual from office, basically firing them from their job. If the person leaves office (quits), it can be likened to pleading guilty - it's over. As to disqualification - the people and the government retain the power to prevent such individuals from re-seeking office. That option is up to us, not the disgraced office holder. I very much doubt any person in such a situation would ever successfully seek office again.
Anyway, you are basically making an elitist case that the people are morons who might re-elect Trump, and you can't have that. But in a democracy you must occasionally take such risks to preserve freedom. Otherwise we devolve into oligarchy, a tyranny of the anointed who decide who is worthy to rule. That is not especially constitutionalist.
And seriously, cleanup your arguments. Many are just beneath you.
Prof. Shugerman echoed the argument I mentioned a few moments ago: that a rule against impeachment of former officeholders “would allow any impeached official to dodge trial and disqualification by resigning even a minute before trial, especially once they had a sense the vote was headed to conviction.” As Shugerman and Brian Kalt have argued: “this rule would have a perverse effect that the most guilty officials would be most likely to avoid disqualification, and it would be odd to put a process so entirely in the hands of a defendant.”
That's an interesting prosecutorial take on a political trial. In my opinion - they are not the same. Politicians should not be disbarred from future offices without a trial of facts which looking at the past Presidential impeachments, they were not.
Supporting my argument and in a major factor in forming my opinion is this:
"We also think that our position is the one that is normatively sound. The impeachment process is a political process that allows Congress to cleanse the government between elections: when there is no time to wait for an appeal to the people. But the impeachment process is a political process. The people doing the impeaching may not only be wrong, but they also might be the wrongdoers. Our position in regard to the scope of disqualification allows the voters, not Congress, to have the last word. If the voters return a disqualified defendant to elective office it is because where in doubt, it is the voters, not their agents in Congress, who should have the last word."
Josh Blackman continues with the first and freshest impeachment case after the adaption of the constitution, an impeachment against a US Senator from PA:
"1799 Senate impeachment trial proceedings of Senator William Blount. He was the first officeholder impeached under the Constitution. During the Senate trial, both Blount's counsel and a House Manager articulated their views about the scope of the Impeachment Disqualification Clause. The views they articulated are consistent with the view we have advanced.
Blount was represented by Alexander J. Dallas. Dallas is well known in today's legal community for serving as the first Reporter of Decisions of the United States Supreme Court. He also held cabinet positions and high state office in Pennsylvania. Dallas explained that the Impeachment Disqualification Clause serves as "in effect, [as] a check or limitation to the general power of the Executive." How? The Senate, by voting to disqualify an officeholder, "declar[es] that the delinquent officer, shall be removed, and that he shall never be re-appointed." Dallas's understanding of the Impeachment Disqualification Clause's design was limited: the Senate had the power to restrict the "attributes and exercises of Executive Authority" that includes the power "to appoint, to re-appoint, or to abstain from re-appointing."
Later in the trial, Dallas reaffirmed his position. He said, "it is manifest, that by the power of [i]mpeachment, the people did not mean to guard against themselves, but against their agents; they did not mean to exclude themselves from the right of re-appointing, or pardoning; but to restrain the Executive Magistrate from doing either, with respect to officers, whose offices were held independent of popular choice." Here too, Dallas's position directly supports the view we have advanced. The Impeachment Disqualification Clause was not designed to serve as a "guard against" the People who use "popular choice" to elect federal officials. Rather, this provision would serve to "guard against" the President's undermining a House impeachment and Senate removal. Consider a situation where a defendant is impeached, tried, convicted, removed, and disqualified. Then, the President re-appoints that person to another appointed position, or even to the same position he previously held. This reappointment would undermine the House's and Senate's power in the impeachment context. In other words, the Impeachment Disqualification Clause prevents the President from re-appointing the disqualified defendant to an office "held independent of popular choice."
The last paragraph of Federalist 77 explains the intent and the plain constitutionalism. There are many other notable and reasonable pled arguments supporting the GOP position as there are many well reasoned arguments from those in opposition.