In Which I Once Again Stand Up for the New York Indictment of Donald Trump

A recent federal court ruling nukes from orbit many of the arguments that commentators have used to criticize Bragg's indictment

Above: Donald Trump fends off all indictments!

In discussing the Trump indictments, it has become Conventional Wisdom to dismiss the Alvin Bragg indictment as a political hack job with no basis in law or evidence. A representative example can be found in a recent Jonah Goldberg column:

I get the argument that the criminal justice system shouldn’t be contorted just to “get Trump”—i.e. hold him accountable for his indefensible but possibly not criminal behavior. But with the exception of the Bragg indictment, I don’t think that’s happening.

I don’t mean to pick on Jonah in particular. His comment is absolutely typical of the general contempt in which the Bragg indictment is held by all right-thinking pundits.

On one level, I get it. It’s my least favorite of the four Trump indictments. That said, regular readers know that I don’t think it’s as bad as most of the critics say. I have been fairly public in pushing back against some of the central arguments used to disparage the indictment—first in a lengthy post on this here Substack, and then in a piece published at The Dispatch

It turns out that I now have a federal court decision on my side.

So let’s revisit some of the old arguments against the Bragg indictment in the light of the recent federal decision, and see if we can’t chip away a bit at this calcification of conservative conviction that simply dismisses the Bragg indictment as an obvious travesty.

Two Central Arguments: 1) Bragg Must Show Trump Himself Committed a Federal Campaign Finance Charge, and 2) Federal Law Preempts the Charge

There are two key arguments undercut by the recent federal decision. (What recent federal court decision is that? Patience! All will become clear in good time.) First: the argument that the prosecution must show that Trump himself committed a federal campaign finance violation, and 2) the argument that federal law preempts the state law charges against Trump. Let’s take a moment and revisit the original arguments in their strongest form, as well as the arguments that I raised in rebuttal at the time.

The Argument That Bragg Must Prove Trump Violated Federal Campaign Finance Law

Sarah Isgur and David French, in a March 23, 2023 Advisory Opinions podcast trashing the Bragg indictment, were among the loudest proponents of the idea that Bragg has to show Trump himself committed a campaign finance felony. Based on this assumption, they further argued that it was up to federal prosecutors whether to bring such a charge, and the feds declined—making it especially inappropriate for Bragg to bring that case as a state prosecutor. As a reminder of their arguments, here are some representative quotes from that podcast (which I quoted in my earlier piece):

ISGUR: It is not clear that a New York state prosecutor can try a federal crime, which is what they’re going to have to do here, basically. They will not be convicting him of that federal crime, but they will have to prove all the elements of that federal crime in order to reach the state crime. And there’s plenty of precedent out there that if the state ties their crime to a federal crime, basically there needs to be a federal conviction of some kind. . . . The feds here specifically declined to bring that case.

. . . .

FRENCH: Here’s a really important factor: Southern District of New York never brought this case.

ISGUR: Southern District of New York as in the federal U.S. Attorney’s Office declined to bring this.

FRENCH: Never brought this case. So then you’re in a situation where the Manhattan D.A. would be in a position where the strongest part of his case, which is absolutely time-barred, is rendered stronger by a federal felony that was never prosecuted and that also the new felony prosecution that he’s bringing might also be time barred. So there’s your double bank shot. So it’s bank shot number one is: wait, no one prosecuted this alleged federal felony, and then bank shot number two is can you prosecute it anyway with the five-year statute of limitations?

. . . .

ISGUR: You are in a messy, messy part of federal campaign finance law. Does a state prosecutor have any business —

FRENCH: Right.

ISGUR: Prosecuting the elements of a federal crime where DOJ has chosen not to do so. And I think there’s a problem there for the state prosecutor as well.

More recently, at The Dispatch, Sarah Isgur repeated the substance of these arguments in a post ranking the four indictments against Trump in terms of their strength. Of the four indictments, Isgur puts the New York case dead last. (As an aside, I think she is right about that ranking. Whatever else you might say about the Bragg indictment, it clearly addresses the most trivial criminal conduct charged in any of the four Trump indictments.) In the process of mocking the New York case, Isgur revives one of the central arguments she and French had previously made against the Bragg indictment: that prosecutors must show that Trump committed a federal campaign finance felony:

New York. Manhattan District Attorney Alvin Bragg’s case against Trump for payments he made to Stormy Daniels ahead of the 2016 election is by far the weakest case—both legally and prudentially. To get a conviction, Bragg would have to prove that Trump committed a federal campaign finance felony on the way to violating New York law—and there are a lot of very good election lawyers who will argue that federal law doesn’t even apply to these facts. As in Georgia, this indictment was also brought by a partisan prosecutor who has leaned into the politics of the case and is seemingly focused on headlines and fundraising. It’s a shame this case was the first to be announced, because it was the easiest for Trump and his supporters to dismiss as a partisan stunt. Even if Bragg managed to secure a conviction, that conviction would be very vulnerable on appeal. I’m not a mind reader, but I’d imagine every other prosecutor involved in a case against Trump wishes this one would go away.

Nobody seems to remember this anymore, but I previously argued that I don’t think Bragg has to show that Donald Trump committed a federal campaign finance felony. I argued that it should be enough to show he was trying to conceal any crime committed by anyone, including any crime committed by Michael Cohen—who admitted in federal court that he had committed a federal campaign finance felony. Here is how I put it in my piece at The Dispatch:

The critical observation to make here is that “another crime” does not have to be Donald Trump’s own violations of federal campaign finance law. You can be guilty of a felony if you intend to “aid” or even “conceal” “another crime” committed by someone else. Notably, a campaign finance violation committed by Michael Cohen could be “another crime” that Trump was trying to conceal with the false recordkeeping. And Cohen pleaded guilty to campaign finance violations regarding both the Stormy Daniels and Karen McDougal payoffs. Even an intent to conceal Cohen’s campaign finance violations is a sufficient basis to elevate Trump’s falsification of records to a felony.

I stand by that argument . . . and, as as we will see, the recent federal decision provides clear support for my position. But before we get to that decision, let’s consider one of the other key arguments raised by critics of the indictment: that Bragg’s prosecution is preempted by federal campaign finance laws.

The Preemption Argument

As with the first argument, let’s pick a powerful statement of the preemption argument, giving its proponents the best possible chance to make their case. In an op-ed in the New York Times titled “The Trump Indictment Is a Legal Embarrassment,” published shortly after the Bragg indictment was unsealed, law professor Jed Shugerman wrote:

Because of pre-emption, it’s entirely possible that the State of New York cannot prosecute a state case based on a federal election filing violation. The underlying crime, as best as we can tell from Mr. Bragg’s news conference and a statement to the press, is a campaign finance violation — spending money for a campaign cover-up without reporting it. However, for a federal election, there is what one might call double pre-emption or confirmed pre-emption: Congress and the State of New York agree that cases about federal campaign filings are for federal courts only, not for states.

The Federal Election Campaign Act has a broad pre-emption clause: “The provisions of this act, and of rules prescribed under this act, supersede and pre-empt any provision of state law with respect to election to federal office.” New York State law confirms that state “filing requirements and the expenditure, contribution and receipt limits” under state law “shall not apply” if there is a federal requirement and a federal filing (in other words, they don’t apply to federal elections).

Federal pre-emption applies most strongly when the subject is the candidate’s own campaign conduct (as opposed to donors’, for example) and when it relates to core issues like filing rules (as in this case against Mr. Trump). Some defenders of the indictment cited some examples of federal courts allowing states to proceed based on state law, but those cases were not about basic campaign filing rules but about a fund-raiser funneling money to his own for-profit business, or they were about rules for donors’ contributions or political action committees, as opposed to the candidates’ conduct. These legal experts did not specify any case allowing a state to prosecute a candidate for his or her own behavior in a core area of campaign regulation like filing requirements.

Federal courts allow for states to regulate the times, places and manner of elections, voter registration, ballot theft and the like. They allow exceptions for pre-emption when the state laws are more tangential to the regulation of federal elections. This state filing law is not tangential to federal campaign filing law, nor is this allegation tangential to the field of federal campaign law. But federal courts have emphasized that the federal law applies most strongly to candidate behavior, especially on filing questions. The application of this state filing law overlaps much more closely with the federal law’s field of campaign finance and filing.

There is good reason for pre-emption for federal campaign finance: the danger of local prosecutors bending state law against federal candidates of the opposing party. Congress and New York have traditionally agreed that federal campaign finance and filing law are for federal courts.

Similarly, also at The New York Times, in a piece titled “The Potential Trump Indictment Is Unwise,” David French raised the preemption defense and declared it strong:

The prosecution may claim that state campaign finance laws apply to Trump, and his payments thus violated New York law, but remember we’re talking about a presidential election. A federal statute expressly states that the relevant campaign finance laws “supersede and pre-empt any provision of state law with respect to election to federal office.” This law represents a formidable barrier to prosecuting Trump under state campaign finance laws, and there is no obvious path around it.

Here is how I responded to the preemption argument in my piece at The Dispatch:

Some have pointed out that New York courts have not yet explicitly tested the concept of elevating a misdemeanor records falsification charge to a felony based on the defendant’s attempting to aid or conceal a federal crime. I don’t know how New York courts would treat this issue, but it is not obvious to me that it makes a difference. After all, it’s not that New York is criminalizing the campaign finance violations themselves. The statute merely criminalizes conduct that indisputably falls within state jurisdiction (falsifying records), and elevates it to a felony if that conduct is committed to aid or conceal “another crime.” The statute does not say “another state crime.” It is not immediately apparent to me that pre-emption doctrines would prevent elevating the crime to a felony by proving that the falsification was intended to conceal a federal crime. In my California practice, for example, I know that federal crimes commonly serve to enhance sentences, or to serve as prior convictions for purposes of elevating, say, a theft crime to a felony. I think falsifying records to cover up a federal crime is something New York penal law can reach, and does reach through this statute. Orin Kerr—as tentatively as I do here—also expresses puzzlement at the critics’ argument.

So those are two of the key arguments raised by critics of the indictment: Bragg must prove Trump committed a federal campaign finance felony, and federal preemption. And I have disagreed with both arguments.

A recent federal decision now backs me up on both points.

The Federal Decision

What is this mystery decision I am talking about? The case is the July 19 decision by United States District Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein, rejecting Trump’s effort to permanently remove the Bragg prosecution to federal court. Although I read a news article about this decision at the time, I did not read the decision itself until recently, when I contemplated doing a post about Mark Meadows removing the Georgia indictment to federal court.

When I read the Hellerstein decision, I forgot all about Mark Meadows. Because Hellerstein’s decision knocks down two central pillars underlying much of the strident criticism of the Bragg indictment—criticism that has led the crowd to conclude, and to repeat ad infinitum, that the indictment is nakedly partisan and has no basis in law or evidence.

First, Hellerstein’s decision says that a jury can convict a defendant of falsifying business records if the jury concludes that the defendant had the intent to commit or conceal another crime, even if the defendant was not convicted of the other crime.

Second, the decision examines the preemption doctrines and concludes: “There is no colorable basis to support a federal preemption defense.”

Let’s take a look at the Hellerstein case and the precedents it cites. I will split this discussion into two sections: 1) first, in a free portion of the newsletter, I will discuss the preemption doctrines, which lie at the heart of much of the criticism of the indictment, and 2) in a section for paid subscribers, I will give you a full discussion of the concept that the prosecution can prove the defendant guilty of falsifying documents without showing that he committed the underlying crime being covered up.

The Argument for Federal Preemption Because a Felony Charge is Predicated on Alleged Violations of State and Federal Election Laws

As I mentioned, the federal decision rejecting Trump’s removal of the Bragg criminal case has a long discussion of preemption, and concludes: “There is no colorable basis to support a federal preemption defense.”

In his removal papers, Trump made an argument generally similar to that made by Shugerman in the New York Times: “that because the Indictment's felony charges are predicated on alleged violations of state and federal election laws, they are preempted by the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA"), 52 U.S.C. § 30143(a).” (As I will discuss in more detail below, however, Trump’s argument does not concentrate on the same state-law statute that Shugerman cites. This appears to be a function of Bragg’s response to Trump’s bill of particulars. More on that below.)

The judge starts his rejection of this argument by explaining that FECA preempts three types of state laws purporting to regulate federal campaign finance law:

(1) State laws "concerning the . . . [organization and registration of political committees supporting federal candidates;"

(2) State laws "concerning the . . . [disclosure of receipts and expenditures by Federal candidates and political committees; and"

(3) State laws "concerning the . . . [limitation on contributions and expenditures regarding Federal candidates and political committees."

Some of this sounds like it might apply to the Trump falsification of records, right? Patience, my child. We’ll get there together.

Not preempted are state laws about matters like when and where elections take place, voter registration, voting fraud, a candidate’s “personal financial disclosure,” and other areas not relevant here. The FEC has regulations that specify that these areas are not preempted by federal law, and case law says that the regulations “define[] the statute’s scope.” What’s more, there is a “strong presumption against pre-emption” in this and other areas. (Huh. Shugerman didn’t mention that part!)

The judge gives specific examples of state laws that have been found not to be preempted by FECA. In one case, the state of New York was allowed to bring an action against the directors of a corporation for using the corporation’s money to contribute to federal PACs. The court held that, even though there are laws about donations to federal PACs, New York nevertheless had an interest in making sure that the directors of a corporation “exercise sound judgment in the expenditure of corporate funds.”

In another case, state Attorneys General investigated a PAC for violating state consumer protection laws. The PAC used a combination of pre-checked boxes and fine print that tricked potential donors into making recurring donations that they did not intend to make. (This PAC is the same WinRed racket that peppers me with several texts a day. Probably you get the same texts. The death penalty is too weak a punishment for these people. But I digress.) The PAC sought to enjoin these state AG investigations, arguing that they were subject to FECA only, and that the state AGs had no business trying to investigate their relentless and dishonest scamming. No dice, said the Eighth Circuit. Because FECA preemption is narrowly construed, states can investigate violations of consumer protection laws even though a PAC is soliciting money only for federal elections. A different result would immunize WinRed “from many generally applicable state laws.”

A key factor in these decisions is the fact that the state statutes in question are laws of general applicability and not ones that specifically purport to regulate federal campaign finance issues. The judge cites a long line of cases that find no preemption when the state laws are “tangential to the regulation of federal elections.” These cases stand in contrast to cases involving state statutes that “regulate conduct specifically covered by FECA.” It is this latter category of cases in which preemption doctrine kicks in.

The judge provides a couple of examples of this latter sort of case, where state laws are in fact preempted. For example, one state statute “barred state legislators from accepting campaign contributions during the legislative session, including when done in connection with a federal election.” Because this statute purported to directly regulate activity covered by FECA, it was preempted. Similarly, courts have found that FECA preempts laws explicitly imposing limitations on campaign contributions (to the extent the limitations apply to federal elections). FECA also preempts state laws mandating disclosure of funding of polls for federal elections. In these cases, the laws directly target conduct specifically covered by FECA, as opposed to laws of general application that happen to tangentially affect conduct covered by FECA.

Once you understand this distinction—which Shugerman does allude to in his piece—I think it’s pretty easy to understand how the judge concludes there is no preemption in Trump’s case. But the details require still further explication.

Judge Hellerstein notes that New York Public Law section 175.10 “is a law of general applicability, prohibiting the falsification of business records for a fraudulent purpose.” As we have discussed many times before, a simple violation of this statute is a misdemeanor, which is elevated to a felony if the falsification is done with the intent to commit, aid, or conceal another crime. As the judge notes, “[a]ny fraudulent falsification” with the requisite intent “proves the felony. The law does not target, or make an exception for, election-related activities. There is no mention of disclosures of campaign contributions or spending, elections, or election laws, state or federal.”

That would seem to end the inquiry, right? But Trump’s lawyers, while conceding that FECA does not preempt section 175.10 “on its face,” nevertheless argue that FECA preempts section 175.10 “if the crime” sought to be committed, aided, or concealed by the records falsification “involves federal elections.”

Again, under the precedents discussed above, this seems like a bad argument, doesn’t it? The relevant distinction is between, on one hand, a law of general application that tangentially intersects with the alleged conduct (which is not preempted), and on the other hand, a law that specifically targets conduct regulated by FECA (which is preempted).

And that’s how Judge Hellerstein comes down. In the process, he gives the meat of what we are going to discuss in the second part of this newsletter for paid subscribers; namely, the shocking proposition that the prosecutors don’t even have to prove up the crime that Trump sought to conceal! For now, I’ll omit the citations to those and other cases from the following block quote. As to the cases that establish the head-scratching proposition that prosecutors need not prove the underlying crime, we will thoroughly discuss those cases in the second part of the newsletter.

(By the way, in the following quote, when the judge references “NYEL § 17-152,” he is talking about a state-law provision that Bragg has identified as one of the crimes that Trump might have been trying to commit, aid, or conceal. Don’t worry, we’ll discuss it in more detail in a moment. For now, there are just two important points to understand in the following quoted passage: first, that a violation of that crime or of FECA is not an element of the business records falsification statute, and second—and relatedly—the prosecution doesn’t even have to prove that those underlying crimes (NYEL § 17-152 or a FECA violation) actually occurred.)

But violations of FECA and NYEL § 17-152 are not elements of the crime charged. The only elements are the falsification of business records, an intent to defraud, and an intent to commit or conceal another crime. The People need not establish that Trump or any other person actually violated NYEL § 17-152 or FECA. Trump can be convicted of a felony even if he did not commit any crime beyond the falsification, so long as he intended to do so or to conceal such a crime.

The Indictment does not intrude on FECA's domain. NYPL § 175.10 is a general law, not one that "specifically regulate[s]" federal elections. And the People's theory of intent under that law does not have the effect of limiting or otherwise interfering with federal regulation of elections. FECA preemption does not apply.

(That’s my bold emphasis. Again, in the second part of the newsletter we will get back to the assertion that “[t]he People need not establish that Trump or any other person actually violated NYEL § 17-152 or FECA.” That is an eye-opener that, if accurate, pretty much bludgeons into a bloody pulp a lot of the punditry that has attacked the Bragg indictment.)

Under the precedents set forth, the analysis in the block quote seems unquestionably correct. NYPL 175.10 is a generally applicable law that happens to touch on campaign finance issues as applied to the instant case, not a law that by its terms specifically targets federal campaign finance activity on its face. Like the WinRed scumbags who violated state consumer protection laws, or the corporate directors who violated state laws against breaching their fiduciary duties, Trump can’t escape a state law of general application by arguing that in this instance, his records falsification happens to touch on activity arguably covered by FECA.

The Argument for Preemption Because NYEL § 17-152 Amounts to a Conspiracy to Promote or Prevent a Presidential Election

I promised you we would discuss NYEL § 17-152 further, and now is the time to do so, because it is central to Trump’s next argument. That statute “makes it a misdemeanor to conspire to ‘promote or prevent the election of any person to a public office by unlawful means’ if at least one conspirator acts upon the conspiracy.” Trump says that statute “amounts to a charge of ‘conspiracy to promote or prevent a presidential election,’” and that such a charge cannot be considered a crime because it is preempted by federal law.

The judge begins by observing that NYEL § 17-152 “makes no distinction between state and federal elections and does not define the range of ‘unlawful means’ that can be the object of the conspiracy.” Then the judge alludes to the scope of FECA preemption that we discussed earlier. Recall that FECA preempts three types of state laws. I’ll repeat those three categories of preempted state laws here again so you don’t have to scroll up to read it again:

(1) State laws "concerning the . . . [organization and registration of political committees supporting federal candidates;"

(2) State laws "concerning the . . . [disclosure of receipts and expenditures by Federal candidates and political committees; and"

(3) State laws "concerning the . . . [limitation on contributions and expenditures regarding Federal candidates and political committees."

The judge says that NYEL § 17-152 does not fit into any of these three categories. “Nor is the conduct prohibited by NYEL § 17-152 covered by any other provision of FECA.”

The judge again draws the (by now familiar) contrast between, on one hand, “provisions of New York's election law that directly target campaign contributions and expenditures, and which, therefore, are preempted,” and on the other hand, laws “generally concerning ‘other areas’ of federal elections.” Examples of the former—preempted laws that specifically target campaign contributions—include a law “that limited the expenditure of party funds as applied to federal elections.” Examples of the latter—non-preempted laws that generally concern other aspects of federal elections—include laws addressing “voter fraud and ballot theft.”

Here, apparently because NYEL § 17-152 does not specifically define the unlawful means forming the object of “a conspiracy to promote or prevent the election of any person to a public office by unlawful means,” the judge concludes that NYEL § 17-152 is more of a law that generally concerns federal elections rather than a specific law targeting campaign contributions and expenditures. As I read the judge’s ruling, the fact that such a general statute might end up encompassing activity relating to federal elections does not preempt the state from enforcing these general laws.

It’s harder for me to evaluate this conclusion because I find Bragg’s proposed application of this law somewhat vague. However, to the extent that I can follow the argument, the judge seems correct that a law of general application is likely not preempted.

The Argument for Preemption Because Bragg Must Show Trump Had an Intent to Defraud the Voting Public

Trump’s final preemption argument is that Bragg must show that Trump “had an intent to defraud ‘the voting public,’” and that this provides yet another avenue for preemption. The judge dismisses this argument summarily, stating that it “fails for the same reasons discussed previously: FECA does not preempt the application of a general state law to conduct related to a federal election except if the law, or its application, constitutes a specific regulation of conduct covered by FECA.”

Conclusion

In the end, I think the judge’s analysis is correct, and Shugerman’s argument fails, for several interrelated reasons.

First, Shugerman describes FECA’s preemption as “broad”—but he never tells his readers about the mountain of precedent that says quite the opposite: that its preemption is, in fact, “narrowly construed.” I omitted citations from my description of, and quotations from, Hellerstein’s decision, but here I think it’s worth giving you a quote that contains the citations:

There is a "strong presumption against pre-emption" that applies with equal force to FECA. Weber v. Heaney, 995 F.2d 872, 875 (8th Cir. 1993). Thus, "even with respect to election-related activities, courts have given [FECA] a narrow preemptive effect. . . ." Stern v. Gen. Elec. Co., 924 F.2d 472, 475 n.3 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Reeder v. Kansas City Bd of Police Comm 'rs, 733 F.2d 543, 546 (8th Cir. 1984)); see also WinRed, Inc., 59 F.4th at 943-44; Janvey v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., Inc., 712 F.3d 185, 200-01 (5th Cir. 2013); Karl Rove & Co. v. Thornburgh, 39 F.3d 1273, 1280 & n.18 (5th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases).

Who are you going to believe? Professor Shugerman, with his claim that “[t]he Federal Election Campaign Act has a broad pre-emption clause” . . . or your lyin’ eyes, as they survey the precedent to the contrary?

Second, Shugerman makes repeated references to the “state filing law” as being the crime that is pre-empted. What he is really trying to say with those references is about as clear as mud, As best as I can make out, he must be referring to New York state laws about reporting campaign contributions. Which, sure, those laws might be preempted—but I have no idea why Shugerman ever thought Bragg was relying on those laws. A Bragg statement linked by Shugerman makes reference to “state and federal election laws.” In his press conference, Bragg mentioned “federal campaign contribution cap” and a “New York election law [] which makes it a crime to conspire to promote a candidacy by unlawful means.”

After Shugerman’s piece was published, Trump asked for a “bill of particulars” that was intended to force Bragg to spell out his theory more specifically, and the prosecution’s response was consistent with Bragg’s statements during the press conference. In that response, the prosecution stated that

the crimes defendant intended to commit or to aid or conceal may include violations of New York Election Law § 17-152; New York Tax Law §§ 1801(a)(3) and 1802; New York Penal Law §§ 175.05 and 175.10; or violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 US.C.§ 30101 et seq.

In other words, the prosecution stated that Trump intended to commit, aid, or conceal the already discussed conspiracy to promote a candidacy by unlawful means, the falsification of business records statutes, and federal campaign finance laws. This is what Trump litigated and lost in Hellerstein’s court.

But more fundamentally, Shugerman—like basically every pundit out there who is familiar with the federal system but not the New York penal law—based his entire argument on an assumption that appears to be false: that proving the falsification of records charge requires Bragg to actually prove the underlying crime Trump sought to conceal.

And it turns out that is wrong. Hellerstein cites a long string of New York state appellate decisions that consistently repeat an admittedly rather surprising holding, which I will discuss next. First, Hellerstein tells us that, as I have previously argued, a jury can convict Trump of falsifying business records, and can decide that Trump had the intent to commit or conceal another crime, even if the jury fails to find Trump committed the other crime.

But Hellerstein goes even further than anything I had previously argued, because Hellerstein also cites precedent to the effect that the prosecution need not show that Trump or any other person actually committed the crime that Trump was trying to cover up!

Whaaaat? Really?!

Yup. That seems to be the law. But what the heck does that even mean?

Looks like we’re going to have to dive deeper into that one.

Rejecting the claim that “Bragg would have to prove that Trump committed a federal campaign finance felony”